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Part II
Pooling Pension Risks and Rewards

Chapter 5
A Regulatory Framework for Strengthening
Defined Benefit Pensions
Mark J. Warshawsky, Neal McCall, and John D. Worth
In the USA, recent financial market and pension events have exposed
serious structural flaws in the regulatory system governing single employer
defined benefit (DB) plans. Evidence of such problems includes substan-
tial unfunded liabilities in the pension system, estimated at approximately
$450 billion, and very large insurance claims for unfunded pension liabil-
ities as the result of the restructuring or liquidation of major companies. At
US fiscal year-end 2004 (September 30), the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC)—government corporation that insures pension
benefits—had only $39 billion in assets to meet $62 billion in liabilities
(the present value of future benefit payments owed to participants of failed
pension plans). The PBGC’s net position fell from a surplus of $7.7 billion
in 2001 to a deficit of $23.3 billion in 2004. In addition, billions of dollars in
benefits earned by thousands of workers, retirees, and their beneficiaries
were lost as a result of the termination of underfunded plans. In response
to these problems, the Administration of President Bush proposed a plan
to strengthen funding for single-employer DB pensions (hereafter, the
Administration Proposal), and Congress has moved to consider a compre-
hensive regulatory reform for these plans.
This chapter discusses four principles that must be recognized in order
to design effective regulations for the DB pension system. After outlining
these principles, we provide examples of how they can be implemented, by
drawing on the recent Administration proposal that is designed to correct
the structural deficiencies in the DB regulatory system. If DB pensions are
to remain a viable, self-financing, retirement option for employers and
employees, the entire system must be placed on a sound financial footing.
In what follows, we briefly describe the regulatory background and then
discuss the motivation for government pension regulation. Then, we high-
light some salient characteristics of the ‘traditional actuarial view’ as
reflected in the current pension funding regime. Next, we outline prin-
ciples for a well-designed pension funding and guaranty regulatory regime
and provide examples of implementation. The last section concludes.
The Regulatory Background
Although DB pensions have existed in the USA since the late nineteenth
century, comprehensive pension regulatory oversight did not exist prior
to the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). Before this law, regulation was piecemeal: plans funded
through insurance companies were subject to state regulation of insurance
company solvency and regulation, while plans managed by banks were
subject to general trust law. The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) was first
modified to make explicit reference to pension plans in 1921, when con-
tributions to employer-based stock bonus profit sharing plans were
exempted from the corporate income tax. But it was not until 1942 that
the legal code was modified to provide some general guidelines on plan
design and operation. Disclosure problems were first addressed in the
Federal Welfare and Pensions Disclosure Act of 1958 and 1962 amend-
ments. The objectives of these laws, however, were limited: they were
designed only to provide participants with enough information to detect
malfeasance on the part of the plan administrator or other interested
parties to enable participants to bring actions against the plan under
existing law. Many deemed the regulatory environment largely ineffective
(McGill et al. 1996).
Regulatory shortcomings became evident to the general public with the
closing of the Studebaker plant in South Bend Indiana and the termination
of its employee pension plan in 1963. Although retirees and active workers
over the plan’s retirement age of 60 received full benefits in the form of
annuities, other participants were far less fortunate. Participants between
40 and 59 with 10 years of service under the plan received lump sum
payments equal to about 15 percent of earned benefits while other vested
employees received nothing. Many cite this termination as the event that
set in motion the reform process that led to the passage of ERISA in 1974
( Jefferson 1993).
Today, ERISA and the IRC provide a general framework for private
sector pension regulation. Current rules set minimum plan funding stand-
ards, standardize the computation of a plan’s financial status, require
certain financial disclosures to participants, and govern the pension insur-
ance system. Pension regulation is motivated by a number of consider-
ations including information asymmetries between the pension plan
sponsor and the plan participants, the noncompetitive nature of employer-
sponsored pension plans, and the tax-favored treatment of pension contri-
butions and investments as will be discussed later. Though ERISA and the
Tax Code have been revised to strengthen plan funding standards and
improve the insurance system on several occasions, most notably in 1987
and 1994, the DB regulatory system continues to suffer from a number of
structural flaws.
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Motivations for Pension Regulation
It is sometimes argued that pension plan sponsors have inherent informa-
tional advantages over plan participants as the sponsors invest assets, moni-
tor returns, and compare assets to future payment obligations. Absent
reporting requirements, many plan sponsors would lack the incentive to
disclose adequately the financial position of the pension fund to partici-
pants. Because of these informational asymmetries, some firms might
mislead participants by under- or not funding the DB plan while acting as
if the plan was well protected. The concern is that this could result in
retirees not receiving the retirement income they anticipated, at a time
in their lives when it would be impossible to remedy the breach. Accord-
ingly, DB plan regulation seeks to minimize this type of outcome.
One might argue that concern over loss of reputation would temper such
plan sponsor behavior and discourage pension defaults. In practice, how-
ever, defaults on pension plans are typically associated with the reorganiza-
tion or liquidation of the sponsoring firm. Because a sponsor that defaults
on its pension obligations has also defaulted on other financial obligations
and because its pension customers are limited to its own employees, repu-
tational effects can fail to constrain sponsor behavior. Also, from the
employee’s viewpoint, the pension contract is a one-shot commitment
not subject to renegotiation. That is, employees have one career and
sometimes one or two employers over which to prepare for retirement; as
such, they lack an effective recourse if their pension promises are defaulted
on. The possibility that a sponsoring firm will default on the contract at
some future date, therefore, is believed to provide a strong basis for DB
plan funding regulation. Minimum funding rules are designed to ensure
that a threshold level of financial backing exists for accrued pension
benefits at all times.
Defined benefit pension plans are noncompetitive: that is, employee
participation—which includes deferral of income—is mandatory with em-
ployment at a firm providing a DB plan, and employees do not have a
choice of retirement assets, outside the pension trust managed by the plan
sponsor. The plan sponsor and plan participants may also have different
assessments of the appropriate priority for plan funding, relative to other
uses of working capital. This is another reason for the establishment of laws
and regulation governing minimum funding requirements: the appropri-
ate segregation of assets and prudent and diversified investments.
The existence of a government guarantee for DB plan benefits, as in the
US pension insurance system, introduces an additional concern for gov-
ernment, namely, that of moral hazard.1 When participants are guaranteed
to receive pension payments, in whole or in part, irrespective of their
pension plan’s performance and its sponsor, they will have less incentive
to be vigilant in monitoring the plan. Further, benefit guarantees in
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employer-sponsored plans provide a greater incentive for workers to ex-
change future promises of pension payments for current wages.
The Traditional Actuarial View
One assumption appears to have motivated the traditional actuarial ap-
proach to pension regulation: namely, that pension sponsors and pension
plans should be thought of as ‘living’ over a very long, indeed, indefinite
time horizon. ERISA rules reflecting this view tend to focus on funding and
measurement of the ultimate pension commitment—pension obligations
that participants will be entitled to at retirement. The accrued benefit
commitment, which measures pension obligations earned to date using
current market values, is thought to be relevant only when a sponsor
intends to terminate a plan.
A good example of how the concept of long-lived plans motivates current
pension regulation and actuarial practice is seen in the area of asset and
liability measurement. Current law views pension liabilities as long-run in
nature and unlikely to be settled in the short-run because (it is implicitly
assumed) pension sponsors are unlikely to be compelled to terminate their
plans. Therefore, ERISA rules allow plan actuaries to choose plan discount
rates that reflect an estimate of the pension funds long-run investment
returns. McGill et al. (1996) argues that the actuarial present value of
future benefits is defined as today’s value of future benefits, taking into
account future investment earnings. This implies that the value of the
pension liability is not determined using the current market value of a
reference security with the same characteristics as those of accrued bene-
fits, but rather by the asset allocation choices and the actuary’s estimate of
expected returns. This approach is clearly focused on long-run results,
since only ‘by coincidence’ will actual results conform to expected ones
(McGill et al. 1996). Basing measures of pension liabilities using returns on
risky assets clearly implies that the plan sponsor will be both willing and
able to make good on any unanticipated investment shortfalls when pen-
sion obligations come due in the future. Using smoothed values of assets
comports with this same long-run view.
Another good example has to do with ERISA plan funding rules. Plan
funding rules are designed to satisfy the ultimate pension commitment
over the long run, rather than to ensure that a plan will have sufficient
assets at any given point in time to meet accrued liabilities (where both are
measured on a current market basis). The ERISA funding rules reflect this
view, for example, by allowing long-amortization periods for new benefits,
even though they are immediately accrued, for investment losses, and for
changes in actuarial assumptions. These long-amortization periods are
motivated by the belief that the plan actuary’s assumptions will be realized
in the long run.
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As these examples suggest, the traditional actuarial approach to pension
regulation as codified in the law treats DB plan sponsors as ongoing and
long-lived entities. This view has influenced how pension regulation has
been structured. Next, we discuss the shortcomings of this view and intro-
duce some important principles for a new approach to pension regulation.
Principles for a Pension Funding and Regulatory
Regime
A well-designed pension regulatory system should take into account four
principles, each of which we take up in turn.
Principle 1: Pension Plans Are Financial Intermediaries. Sponsoring firms
take deferred compensation from employees and contribute it on their
behalf to pension plans. This money, in turn, is made available to the
capital markets when the plan invests in stocks, bonds, and other financial
instruments. In exchange, the pension plan promises participants a stream of
future annuity payments or, in some cases, the lump-sum equivalent of such
payments, in accordance with the plan’s design. Although the DB plan is an
independent entity under the law, its financial well-being is wholly dependent
on contribution and investment decisions made by the sponsoring firm.
As financial intermediaries, it seems sensible to hold pension plans to the
standards of reporting transparency and market value discipline that apply
in other financial markets. For example, most financial regulators require
that assets be valued at current and not past prices. Yet ERISA allows
pension assets values to not be marked-to-market, but rather to reflect
‘smoothed’ values based on past prices. Following Bader and Gold
(2003), we identify three standards of financial practice that are the basis
for the reporting transparency and market value discipline that regulators
enforce for most financial intermediaries and can be applied to pension
funds. These are (a) employee exchanges of current for future compensa-
tion and valuations of pension assets and liabilities must be conducted
at market prices or values; (b) because pension liabilities are not traded
in a market there are generally no observable prices; accordingly, pension
liabilities should be valued using prices for similar liabilities trading in
liquid markets; and (c) all involved parties have a right to timely and
complete information about the current market-based values of assets
and liabilities.
Voluntary financial trades do not generally take place at nonmarket
values or in the absence of current information on prices. When employers
and employee bargain (formally or informally) over compensation, one
dimension of the negotiation is the form that compensation will take—
cash wages or salaries, or deferred postretirement pension benefits. In the
case of formal negotiations under collective bargaining agreements, the
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trade is often explicit, though in other cases the exchange is implicit. If the
assets backing the promise of deferred compensation or the pension
liabilities (the discounted value of the future pension benefit payments)
are not accurately valued because of smoothing, the transaction itself does
not use market prices.
For example, assume that an employee has computed the expected value
of receiving promised future benefits based on the degree to which those
benefits are backed by assets, i.e. are funded. Based on this expected value
and his preferences, he will decide on an optimal rate of substitution
between current wages and future benefit payments in determining the
composition of compensation package. If available information on plan
funding is based on smoothed asset values and liabilities, however, the
employee’s choice will be distorted. His optimal mix of current and de-
ferred compensation would change if his decision were based on market
prices for assets and liabilities. Similarly, smoothed asset and liability meas-
ures do not provide shareholders, potential investors, and others with a
true picture of a pension plan’s financial status. Under ERISA, the actuarial
value of DB plan assets may differ from the fair market value of plan assets
because it may be determined under a formula that smoothes fluctuations
in market value by averaging the value over a period of up to five years (US
Treasury 2005). In a similar manner, pension liabilities are computed using
a discount rate that is either a long-run assumed rate of return on invest-
ments or a four-year smoothed Treasury bond rate.
Another concern applies to the appropriate method for valuing pension
liabilities. Pension benefit payments are similar to debt and therefore, it
can be argued, should be discounted at rates applicable to that debt. In this
case, liabilities would be discounted using interest rates that are matched to
the timing of the future benefit payment cash flows. Such matching can be
accomplished through the use of a yield curve of zero coupon bonds.
Generally, higher interest rates would be used to discount benefit payments
expected to be made further in the future, with lower interest rates apply-
ing for benefit payments made in the near term. Discount rates used for
establishing funding requirements would then be based on current returns
on bonds with the same credit quality that pension obligations are assumed
or are deemed to have and that mature on the same dates as the future
benefit payment obligations come due.
An economically coherent approach, and one that provides the most
meaningful measure of liabilities, recognizes that once pension promises
are made and backed by assets there is a high probability that they will be
kept. Accordingly a consistent approach to pension liability discounting
would adopt high-quality corporate bonds as the appropriate source of
rates. This contrasts with current law, where two discount rates are used—
one selected by the actuary as part of the actuarial valuation and calculation
of the original minimum funding requirement, and another set by law and
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used in the computation of the plan’s current liability. The latter is a
measure that is defined as part of a set of backstop minimum funding
rules put in place in 1987 to require poorly funded plans to improve their
funding. Regardless of the minimum funding requirement computed by
the actuary, if a plan’s funding as measured by current liability falls below
certain thresholds, then supplemental deficit reduction contributions
(DRCs) are required.
The discount rate used in current actuarial pension plan valuations is
based on the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated investment experience
in the plan—the best estimate of the long-run future earnings on plan
assets (US Treasury 2005). This approach is at odds with standard financial
practice. The present value of a debt is unrelated to expected earnings on
the assets that are used to secure the debt. As Bader and Gold (2003) note,
corporate debt is not discounted using a firm’s projected return on cor-
porate assets, therefore, it is inappropriate to discount pension liabilities at
that rate. Moreover, the discount rate used as part of the actuarial valuation
is typically a single rate rather than a yield curve as would be necessary for
accurate valuation of the liabilities.
The discount rate used in computing current liability is not based on
actuarial judgment, but is a standardized assumption set in law. In the past,
the discount rate has been based on a four-year weighted average of the
rate of interest on the thirty-year Treasury bond. The Pension Funding
Equity Act of 2004 specified that the interest rate used to determine
current liability be based on the weighted average of interest rates on
long-term corporate bonds. These standardized assumptions are inaccur-
ate both because they do not use current market rates and because they do
not reflect the timing of future cash flows.
These flaws in liability measurement along with permitted smoothing of
assets cause traditional measures of assets and liabilities to be inaccurate
and misleading. Two recent real-world examples provide evidence of just
how misleading these values can be. In its last filing prior to termination,
Bethlehem Steel Corporation reported that its pension plan was 84 percent
funded on a current liability basis. At termination, however, the plan
proved to be only 45 percent funded on a termination basis, with under-
funding totaling $4.3 billion. Similarly, in its last filing prior to termination,
the US Airways Pilots plan was reported to be 94 percent funded on a
current liability basis; at termination, it proved to be only 33 percent
funded (Kandarian 2003a).
The regulatory changes embedded in the Administration proposal take
the position that market values of assets, along with correctly and accurately
measured pension liabilities, are sensible. Further, the proposal requires
that all pension plan liabilities be measured on an accrual basis using
consistent rules and standards, and it requires the use of current market
values of assets. The plan also requires that the discounted value of pension
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liabilities be determined using a series of interest rates drawn from a yield
curve for high-quality zero-coupon corporate bonds. Finally, it also stipu-
lates that pension plan participants, regulators, and investors should re-
ceive timely and accurate information about pension plan assets and
liabilities.
Principle 2: Plan Sponsors and Pension Plans Are Not Always Long-Lived. A
pension plan termination may be coincident with the dissolution or
reorganization of a financially distressed sponsor, or it may be terminated
at the sponsor’s option at an earlier date. This fact has important
implications for the design of pension regulations because failing firms
will default on any existing unfunded obligations at the time of their
failure. In particular, it suggests that, even abstracting from fairness issues,
private pensions are ineffective intermediaries for intergenerational
transfers. Pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) private pension systems guarantee
future defaults. To the extent that pension funding rules allow for
accrued liabilities to be unfunded, pension plans operate on a partial
PAYGO basis.
Table 5-1 shows the average cumulative default rates of corporate bond
issuers as computed by Moody’s Investor Service (2005). This table indicates
that, over time, even some of the highest-rated companies experience signifi-
cant financial difficulties and ultimately some of them default on obligations.
For example, 2 percent of firms with the highest credit ratings at the begin-
ning of the sample (1970) defaulted over a twenty-year period. Looking at
companies with a Moody’s rating of Ba, the table indicates that 10.72 percent
default within 5 years and 37 percent within 20 years. For firms in the Caa-C
rating, nearly four-fifths, 78.53 percent, default within 20 years.
Defaults on US pension sponsor commitments result in claims on
the government-chartered guarantor, the PBGC. During the economic
Table 5-1 Average Cumulative Default Rate by Credit Rating, 1970–2004
Moody’s credit rating
Years Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa-C
1 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.19 1.22 5.81 22.43
3 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.98 5.79 19.51 46.71
5 0.12 0.20 0.50 2.08 10.72 30.48 59.72
7 0.30 0.37 0.85 3.12 14.81 39.45 68.06
10 0.63 0.61 1.48 4.89 20.11 48.64 76.77
15 1.22 1.38 2.74 8.73 29.67 57.72 78.53
20 1.54 2.44 4.87 12.05 37.07 59.11 78.53
Source: Moody’s Investor Services (2005).
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downturn in the early 1990s, the pension insurance program absorbed
large claims—$600 million for the Eastern Airlines plans and $800 million
for the Pan American Airlines plans. More recently, the PBGC has taken in
steel and airline plans with extremely large unfunded liabilities. Steel plan
claims—resulting from plan sponsor defaults on obligations—have in-
cluded $1.3 billion for National Steel, $1.9 billion for LTV Steel, and $3.9
billion for Bethlehem Steel. Airline claims have included a $600
million claim for the US Airways pilots’ plans in February 2003 and a $2.3
billion claim for the terminated US Airways plans covering flight attend-
ants, machinists, and other ground employees in January 2005. The largest
claim against the single-employer insurance fund to date occurred in April
2005 when PBGC agreed to the termination of United Airline’s four major
pension plans. The total claim of these four plans against the insurance
fund is expected to be $6.6 billion. Participants are expected to lose $3.2
billion in unfunded nonguaranteed benefits. Figure 5-1 shows the time
series of dollar claims on the PBGC, clear evidence that plan sponsors can
and do default on pension obligations due to failing financial health,
bankruptcy, and liquidation. The figure indicates that (in nominal terms)
claims in 2002, 2003, or 2004 were, by far, the largest claims in PBGC’s
history.
Firms generally have a below investment grade (BIG) credit rating for
several years prior to defaulting on pension obligations triggering a PBGC
claim. After studying twenty-seven large claims, the PBGC found that most
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of the plan sponsors had been BIG for several years prior to termination;
none of the plans had been BIG for less than three years prior to termin-
ation (Kandarian 2003b). This suggests that, while defaults are certainly not
easily predictable far in the future (many other plans with BIG credit
ratings did not default), a low credit rating for a plan sponsor is a clear
warning sign that any responsible set of laws and regulations should take
into account.
The list of companies whose financial difficulties have resulted in de-
faults on pension obligations and, in claims against the PBGC, is enlighten-
ing. It includes many companies, who, in their day, were industry leaders
and undoubtedly considered excellent credit risks with strong futures.
Sponsoring firms that have defaulted on their pension obligations includes
former retailers such as Bradlees, Caldor, Grand Union, and Payless Cash-
ways; steelmakers including Bethlehem, LTV, National, Acme, Empire,
Geneva, and RTI; other manufacturers, such as Singer, Polaroid, Harvard
Industries, and Durango; and airlines, such as United Airlines, TWA, Pan
American, Eastern, and US Airways. This list underscores the fact that the
future is uncertain, and almost any company, regardless of how secure it
appears today, can face significant financial hardships in the future that
might result in plan termination and pension obligation default due to
either individual and secular circumstances.
Most discussion on losses from plan terminations centers on claims
against the government pension guarantor; however, these are best
thought of as a proxy for the total losses arising from the default on
unfunded pension liabilities. Even though plan participant benefits are
backed by a limited guarantee, underfunded pension plan terminations
can lead to significant worker benefit reductions. In many cases, these
benefit reductions have been significant. When pension benefits are in-
sured by a government entity, defaults raise the risk that taxpayers will be
asked to pay for broken promises. Under the current government guaran-
tee system, the pension insurer is required to be self-financing; it does not
have full faith and credit backing of the USA. Despite this mandate,
however, the insurer has no authority to set premium rates or to reject
coverage for plans that pose a very high risk of filing a claim. It is not
surprising that under these circumstances the insurer has run a substantial
deficit for most of its existence. Because the insurer is a government
corporation with a limited line of credit to the Treasury, the insurer’s
deficit is not viewed as a major problem by plan sponsors who, along with
participants, seem to count on the existence of an implicit guarantee of
private pension obligations. A financially unsound government insurance
system clearly puts the taxpayer at risk.
Recognition of the finite lives of pension plans and their sponsors
implies that a sensible set of pension funding rules would do well to:
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(1) Set a plan funding goal for plans to maintain assets sufficient to meet
an accurate measure of accrued liabilities. Funding ratios should be
computed using assets and liabilities that are measured accurately
and meaningfully as described earlier. When assets fall short of plan
liabilities, sponsors should be required to remedy that shortfall by
funding up in a timely manner;
(2) Set a higher funding target for plans with sponsors in financial
difficulty or that reflects both accrued liabilities and other costs
incurred when a plan is terminated; and
(3) Prohibit plans from incurring additional liabilities when they are
significantly underfunded, particularly plans that are sponsored by
financially troubled firms. Restrictions on the addition of new bene-
fits limit liability growth as a plan becomes progressively under-
funded relative to its funding target.
Each of these elements is applied in a meaningful manner in the Admin-
istration’s proposed reforms. In addition to the requirements to mark
assets to market and use an accurate and meaningful method for discount-
ing plan liabilities, the proposal sets accrual-based funding targets based on
these measures. The funding target for any plan reflects the financial
health of the plan sponsor.
Current pension funding rules focus on prescribing annual contribu-
tions that move plans gradually toward a long-term funding target. This
approach has resulted in plans being significantly underfunded for long
periods. A regulatory regime that allows significant long-term underfund-
ing does not, in our opinion, reflect the principle of that pension plan
sponsors and, therefore, pension plans are not always very long lived. One
need only look at recent examples from the steel and airline industries to
recognize the basic unfairness and human cost resulting from not recog-
nizing and incorporating this principle into pension regulation. The Ad-
ministration proposal requires sponsors that fall below minimum funding
targets to fund up toward their target in a timely manner and imposes
benefit restrictions on significantly underfunded plans, especially those
sponsored by companies in poor financial health. Allowing permanent
underfunding virtually guarantees that participant and pensions insurer
losses stemming from sponsor default at from the time of reorganization or
liquidation will be larger than necessary.
Thus far we have discussed the termination of pension plans coincident
with the reorganization or dissolution of the sponsoring firm—typically
when the plan sponsor defaults on obligations. However, the termination
of a pension plan at the sponsor’s discretion can also occur if sponsors
freeze a plan and pay benefit obligations fully as they come due; or, when a
sponsor ends a plan through a standard termination and meets all its
obligations immediately. Sponsors have the right, except when constrained
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by collective bargaining agreements, to either freeze a plan or take it
through a standard termination at any time. Of course in the case of a
standard termination, the plan must have sufficient assets to satisfy all
benefits through an annuity insurance contract. Historically most plans
have ended by way of a freeze or a standard termination.
This means that employers are obligated to provide participants benefits
only for past service. However, participants may believe that there is an
implicit contract to continue such plans in order to enable them to earn
future benefits until they reach retirement. Continuation of service until
retirement is especially valuable to participants in back-loaded final pay
plans. This characteristic of DB plans has two important implications for
pension funding policy. First, minimum funding targets cannot obligate
sponsors to maintain funding above that level needed to satisfy close out
costs for accrued benefits. As discussed later, prefunding of anticipated
benefit increases, through either amendments in flat dollar plans or salary
increases in final pay plans, could be permitted and even encouraged but
not required. Funding targets in the Administration proposal are directly
related to accrued benefits.
Further, setting minimum funding targets below the level of accrued
benefits is problematic. Some have argued that rules allowing perennial
underfunding are beneficial to participants, because plan sponsors will
need to make large payments in order to exit the system, thus encouraging
them to stay. Clearly, this is not a responsible regulatory approach, as it
implicitly assumes that pension plan sponsors are very long-lived. It seems
more appropriate to design funding rules so they do not ‘trap’ sponsors
into underfunding. When plans exit the system responsibly by way of
standard terminations, satisfying all their pension obligations immediately,
or by way of plan freezes, satisfying all outstanding obligations as they come
due, participants receive all benefits they are owed and there are no claims
against the guaranty program.
Principle 3: Plan Sponsors and Participants Are Economic Agents and
Therefore Respond to Incentives in Predictable Ways. An effective
pension regulatory regime is one where plan sponsors and participants
are seen as economic agents that respond to incentives in predictable ways.
In the context of a pension regulatory regime, this takes the form of
providing incentives for plans to make contributions sufficient to
maintain adequate funding levels.
Four components of current practice would provide plan sponsors with
adequate incentives to fund pension obligations. These four mechanisms
are: (a) funding rules that require plans to make up funding shortfalls
(relative to a meaningful funding target) in a timely manner, (b) benefit
restrictions that limit liability growth as a plan becomes progressively
underfunded relative to its funding target, (c) a meaningful system of
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insurance premiums that reflects the risk that a plan imposes on the
guaranty system (in systems that include a pension benefit guarantor or
guaranty mechanism), and (d) tax incentives that encourage plans spon-
sors to contribute more than the minimum required contribution. These
mechanisms would induce firms to fund up quickly, reduce the rate at
which new obligations accrue, and compensate the insurance fund for risk;
also they would provide incentives for rational, forward-looking managers
to ensure that plan assets are closely matched with plan obligations on an
ongoing basis.
The current pension regulation regime has failed to ensure adequate
plan funding, in part because current rules give sponsors inadequate
incentives to fund accrued liabilities adequately. The interaction of inad-
equate plan funding rules with a pension guaranty system in which pre-
miums do not reflect the risk of loss from such underfunding creates
incentives for financially weak plan sponsors to make generous pension
promises rather than increase wages. Employees have an incentive to agree
to this arrangement because the PBGC provides a guaranty of many of
these pension benefits. Figure 5-2 shows the result of a system with such
weak and perverse funding incentives.
Plans are generally not required to make up funding shortfalls in a timely
manner under current law. Under the ERISA rules, amortization periods
vary depending on the source of the unfunded accrued liability: if an
unfundedaccruedliability isattributabletoanactuarial loss, theamortization
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Figure 5-2. Underfunding of underfunded single-employer pension plans (billions
of dollars).
Source: Belt (2005).
Note: 2004 data are estimated.
5 / Regulatory Framework for Strengthening DB Pensions 83
period is five years, but if it is due to a plan amendment, the amortization
period is thirty years. If the plan is subject to DRC rules, the minimum
required contribution for the year is based on a complex formula that
includes a contribution related to current underfunding that generally
amortizes that shortfall over a period of four to seven years. The DRC,
however, has been ineffective in ensuring adequate plan funding because it
is based on a liability measure that is inaccurate and plans do not become
subject to the DRC sufficiently quickly when they become underfunded.
The DRC applies only when the actuarial value of the plan’s assets is less
than 90 percent of current liability. In addition, the DRC rules do not apply
if the actuarial value of the plan’s assets is between 80 and 90 percent of
current liability, provided that the plan’s assets were at least 90 percent of
current liability in 2 consecutive years out of the last 3 years. The lack of a
consistent requirement to make-up funding shortfalls in a timely manner
reduces the incentive to keep plans well funded.
Benefit restrictions are critical because they limit liability growth as a
plan becomes progressively underfunded relative to its funding target. It is
important to arrest the growth of liabilities when plans become danger-
ously underfunded in order to ensure that plan participants collect bene-
fits that they accrue. Under current law, sponsors of underfunded plans
can continue to provide for additional accruals and, in many situations
even make benefit improvements. For this reason, companies have an
incentive to provide generous pension benefits rather than increase cur-
rent wages, and employees may go along because of the PBGC guaranty. If a
company’s plan is poorly funded, the company should be precluded from
adopting further benefit increases unless it fully funds them, especially if it
is in a weak financial position. Accordingly, the Administration proposal
included a set of benefit limitations reflecting both the plan sponsors
financial health and degree of underfunding relative to their funding
target.
Finally, when a pension regulatory system includes a pension benefit
guarantor or guaranty mechanism, it is critical to have premiums reflect the
risk that each plan imposes on the insurance system; failure to do so
encourages irresponsible behavior by both plan sponsors and plan partici-
pants. The absence of proper risk-based pricing creates a system subject to
moral hazard because the guarantor bears the risks associated with negoti-
ated agreements between employers and employees. In this situation, both
the employer/plan sponsor and plan participants have an incentive to
increase levels of unfunded accrued benefits up to the guaranty limit of
the guarantor.
The current PBGC premium structure relies heavily on flat-rate, rather
than risk-based, premiums and does not reflect the risk of plan termin-
ation. Accordingly, existing ‘variable’ premiums embody only part of the
PBGC’s exposure to each pension plan, as the current exposure measure is
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a poor measure of the plan’s underfunding. The system’s weakness is
exacerbated by rules that exempt underfunded plans from paying variable
premiums in many situations. For instance, variable premiums are charged
at a fixed rate per dollar of unfunded vested liability as defined in statute.
As a result, plans can be substantially underfunded and still pay no variable
premiums. Despite substantial underfunding, only about 10 percent of
participants were in plans that paid any risk-based premium in 2003.
The Administration has sought to make premiums better reflect the risks
that underfunded plans pose to the system. Risk-based premiums would be
set as a fixed charge per dollar of plan underfunding, as previously, but
unlike current law, underfunding is to be measured against each plan’s
funding target. The idea is that plans sponsored by financially weak firms
have higher funding targets than those sponsored by healthy firms. Con-
sequently underfunding charges will reflect the higher risk of plan termin-
ation posed by a weak company on the system.
Principle 4: Governments Cannot Provide a Financial Guaranty to Protect
One Group from Risk Without Exposing Itself and Taxpayers to
Risk. Financial economics shows that risks do not disappear, simply by
shifting them among parties. Earlier we have argued that current pension
rules permit, indeed encourage, sponsors to underfund their plans over
long periods. At the same time, premium revenues are artificially restricted
at levels well below those needed to meet contingent liabilities and are
structured in a way that is largely unrelated to the insured risk. These
practices transfer the risks associated with terminations of poorly funded
plans to other plan sponsors, participants, and perhaps ultimately the
taxpayer. Tighter funding rules which require plans to maintain assets
equal in value to accrued liabilities can significantly reduce the risk that
underfunded plans pose to the system. To ensure that residual idiosyncratic
risks are borne by the insurance system rather than by participants and
taxpayers, PBGC premiums must be adjusted regularly to reflect such risk. A
pension regulatory system that allows plan sponsors to shift risk does not
reduce the amount of risk; rather, it simply exposes other parties to that risk.
Figure 5-3 shows the net position of the PBGC’s single-employer insurance
fund. It has posted record deficits recently, in 2004, reporting a deficit of
more than $23 billion. This large negative net position reflects PBGC’s
assumption (and likely future assumptions) of obligations of pension
plans whose sponsors defaulted on their liabilities.
Conclusions
Defined benefit pensions can be a valuable means for providing retirement
income, but without reform, the US system is not likely to survive. Existing
rules fail to take into account principles of sound pension regulation; this,
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in turn, led to widespread pension plan underfunding and a large and
growing deficit in the pension guaranty fund. Although well-designed
pension funding rules can do little to avert sponsor bankruptcies and
accompanying plan terminations, this chapter argues that they can limit
losses to participants and remaining sponsors.
The DB pension system can continue to be a source of retirement
income for participants far into the future, if the fundamental principles
of financial economics are integrated into pension regulation. The Admin-
istration’s proposed reform of the single-employer DB system can lead to
better funded plans, with fewer claims from termination than under cur-
rent law (PBGC 2005). Ignoring these issues can ultimately lead to larger
losses for participants, large premium increases for remaining plan spon-
sors, the possible insolvency of the government guarantor, and conceivably
political pressure for bailout.
Endnote
1. This is also an issue in other countries; see McCarthy and Neuberger (this
volume) on the recently adopted UK pension insurance scheme.
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